Search results

Mobile learning is a unique form of learning which uses the distinct features of mobile devices. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the present state of student and faculty perception towards m-learning at open and distance educational institutes in Pakistan.

The paper presents a conceptual model based on TAM, which explains factors influencing student and faculty perception towards m-learning acceptance. M-learning acceptance mainly depends on personal attitude, so this study focusses on individual context. Primary data from students and faculty including tutors (n=612, students =448, faculty/tutors=162) was collected through a properly designed questionnaire by using purposive convenient sampling technique during Autumn 2015 semester. Structural equation modelling was used to analyse the collected data.

The results indicate that student and faculty skill readiness and self-efficacy influence perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness, where these two factors along with prior experience positively influence behavioural intension (BI) to accept mobile learning. Furthermore study results specifically provide factors which positively influence BI either directly or indirectly.

The study was limited to AIOU.

The study specifically provides factors which influence BI either directly or indirectly.

The purpose of this paper is to simulate internal credit ratings based on stock market data and gain the credit information about listed companies.

According to the concept of default distance, default probability of listed companies is obtained from stock's price process based on generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic‐M model with the generalized error distribution, then credit ratings based on the default probability is built. Moreover, the model's validity is proved using the statistical tests and nonparametric receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve method.

Application of the proposed methodology on data from Chinese stock market illustrates that default probability model can identify the credit risk of listed companies effectively using the statistical tests and nonparametric ROC curve method. The results from simulating credit ratings based on default probability are positive correlated with the corresponding results from Xinhua Far East China Ratings.

The internal credit ratings‐based default probability can reflect the change of credit quality for listed companies according to market information. For listed companies, especially which possibly suffer from accounting manipulations, the ratings will help investors and supervisors gain their credit information in time.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of retailer innovation investment and its spillover’s effect on competitive dual-channel supply chain pricing and optimization strategy, and explore the coordination mechanism considering decision maker’s bargaining ability.

The Cournot and Stackelberg game methodology are made use of for the duopoly decentralized and joint decision-making model. The bargaining theory with different negotiation ability was used to analysis the coordination mechanism. Then this paper validates the model by simulation techniques.

The results enlightened some interesting facts, the increase in innovation demand coefficient spur rise in channel pricing, innovation investment level, supply chain profit and consumer welfare. The rise in innovation spillover coefficient leads to increase in online channel pricing, supply chain profit and consumer welfare. Due to the innovation spillover effect, retailer has to maintain channel competitiveness either through low price or high innovation investment strategies. In addition, online channel pricing, supply chain profit and consumer welfare in joint decision-making scenario is greater than that of decentralized decision-making scenario, while the difference in retailer channel pricing depends on parameters value. The increase in retailer’s joint negotiation factor leads to decrease in channel pricing and innovation investment level. Furthermore, there existence of an optimal innovative investment cost sharing proportion threshold indicates the achievement of dual-channel supply chain coordination. A refinement equilibrium can be achieved through Robinstein bargaining game. A larger interest discount factor leads to decrease in profit.

The research provides a theoretical reference for dual-channel supply chain pricing and coordination strategy under channel competition environment. The research can develop innovative investment strategies for retailers and implement response strategies for manufacturers.

The purpose of this research is to propose and validate a theoretical framework explaining web-rooming and showrooming as a multi-stage decision-making process. The authors have used consumer purchase decision-making theories to propose a model that identifies showrooming and webrooming as a combination of two decisions, channel choice during information search and channel choice during actual purchase. Further, the authors explored how various antecedents of showrooming and webrooming have differential effects on various stages of a purchase decision-making process and how product type moderates the relationships.

The authors have conducted empirical research, whereby 243 responses were obtained from a cross-sectional survey. The authors have used structural equation modeling and multiple regression analysis to validate our theoretical model.

Webrooming or showrooming is a multi-stage decision-making process for the consumers. First, consumers decide whether to search online or offline and then whether to buy online and offline. Different individual, purchase context-related and channel related factors impact these decisions. Product type governs which variables will be more important than others.

The research looks to enhance the understanding of the consumer's decision-making process during showrooming and webrooming while also helping retailers design and implement appropriate strategies that could affect consumers during information search and actual purchase.

This paper aims to explore product pricing and green promotion effort policies and further analyzes the influences of financing interest rate, green promotion effort and free-riding behavior on the optimal strategies.

Research will be conducted with the aid of Stackelberg game research method, considering that the manufacturer has financial constraints and financing from e-commerce platform, and consumers have dual preferences, based on the two models of no green promotion effort for physical store and green promotion effort for physical store to explore dual-channel green supply chain strategies.

This research puts forward the following findings, in the two models: the rise in financing interest rate leads to an increase in wholesale and selling prices of dual channels and a decrease in demand of dual channels. The green promotion effort has a positive impact on wholesale prices, selling prices and demand of dual channels. The rise of free-riding rate makes offline wholesale and selling prices fall, whereas online wholesale and selling prices rise.

This research results can provide reference for the decision-making in the context of supply chain financing and free-riding.

The convenience of online shopping enables the manufacturer to develop direct channels. To counter manufacturer encroachment, the retailer tends to provide presale service to attract more customers. Meanwhile, the service provided by the retailer also has a positive impact on the manufacturer's sale volume, which is usually called the showrooming effect or free-ride. The purpose of this paper is to explore the dynamic game of pricing and service strategy in a dual-channel supply chain with risk attitudes and free-ride.

This paper considers the risk attitude, characterized by mean-variance theory. First, the optimal pricing and service strategy of two static models under two scenarios are derived. Second, dynamic games are then considered to explore the evolution of the decisions. The classical optimization method is used to solve the problem, and numerical experiments are done to analyze the complex characteristic of the system.

The result shows that the retailer is willing to provide a higher level of service if his risk preference is higher. The offline retail price and online retail price are positively related to the retailer's risk preference. Besides, the free-ride behavior can reduce the offline retail price and the level of service provided by the retailer. Furthermore, the study indicates that the system is more likely to enter chaos if the retailer's risk preference is higher. Additionally, consumers' service sensitivity and cost coefficient affect the stability of the system.

The study provides a different perspective on supply chain management considering risk attitudes and free-ride The findings of the study can offer theoretical and practical guidance for enterprises to choose adjustment measures according to their risk preference.

The purpose of this study is to provide an optimal joint strategy of multi-period pricing and sales effort for a retailer with a logit choice demand in an integrated channel.

Customer demand is characterized by a logit choice model, it varies over time and is influenced by price and sales effort. The multi-period decision model for the retailer is constructed using a discrete-time dynamic programming method to determine the optimal price and sales effort in each period.

When the inventory level does not exceed a certain threshold, decreasing price and increasing sales effort over time or as inventory level increases are the optimal strategies. However, once the inventory level exceeds the threshold, the optimal strategy is to maintain both price and sales effort constant as the inventory level changes or to increase price and decrease sales effort over time. Additionally, the greater the influence of sales effort on demand or the higher the arrival rate of customers, the higher the optimal price and the greater the optimal sales effort level.

This study contributes to the existing research on dynamic pricing and sales effort in integrated channels by incorporating a logit choice model. Furthermore, it provides valuable management insights for retailers operating in an integrated channel to make pricing and sales effort decisions based on inventory level and time period.

This study explores the impact of EN's (venture entrepreneurs, simplified as EN) jealousy fairness concerns coefficient on two-stage venture capital decision-making in cases of symmetrical and asymmetrical information. It discusses the equilibrium solution of two-stage venture.

The principal-agent model was established based on multiple periods, and differentiated contracts were established at different stages. The validity of the models and the contract was verified by numerical simulation.

The results suggest that with the increase in the EN fairness concerns coefficient, the effort level of EN decreases continuously and decreases faster in the second stage because this is the last stage. The level of VC's (venture capitalist, simplified as VC) effort declines first and then increases; that is, VC will increase the effort level when the fairness concerns coefficient increases to a certain threshold. To motivate EN to pay more effort, VC will increase the incentive to EN in the first stage. However, it will reduce the level of incentive to EN in the second stage. In the limited stage of venture investment, consider that the fairness concerns of EN do not make the profits of EN and VC achieve Pareto improvement simultaneously.

First, the authors implanted fairness concerns into multi-stage venture capital and discussed the impact of fairness concerns on the efforts and returns of both parties. Second, among the influencing factors of the project output, the authors consider the bilateral efforts of EN and VC, the working capacity of EN, the initial investment scale, and the external uncertain environment.

Distribution systems usually utilize both traditional retailing channels in conjunction with e-channels. The purpose of this paper is to investigate a dual-channel supply chain, comprising a traditional retailing channel and an e-channel under disruption. By benchmarking against the centralized decision structure, the authors intend to propose a collaboration model to achieve channel coordination as well as more reliable decisions.

Four different channel disruption scenarios, with customers’ reaction toward disruptions, are examined, and then, optimal pricing decisions for both centralized and decentralized decision-making structures are extracted. Next, a collaboration mechanism based on the dominancy power of channel members is developed to entice all channel members to participate in channel coordination. By benchmarking the proposed collaboration model against both the decentralized/centralized structures a win–win solution is guaranteed for all channel members. In addition, the proposed model ensures more reliable decisions than the centralized structure, as it guarantees less fluctuated income levels.

This study shows, as the disruption probability grows, the channel profit decreases while the channel-retailing price increases. Furthermore, the exact alignment of the centralized decision-making approach and the proposed collaboration model is not achievable due to the problem infeasibility. Numerical experiments and sensitivity analyses benchmark the performance of the proposed collaboration mechanism against the centralized structure for the full alignment with centralized decision-making approach.

This study contributes to the channel conflict literature as jointly considers pricing decisions, disruptions and coordination. Further, consumers’ reaction toward disruption is analyzed through a transshipment agreement.

With the booming of live commerce, sellers provide products through not only their traditional channels but also the anchors who show products by live broadcast, forming a live commerce supply chain. In fact, such selling mode generates two effects: the live broadcast service of the anchor affects the return rate of products sold live (live commerce effect) and related products of the manufacturer sold via its own channel (live commerce spillover effect). In this paper, the authors investigate the impacts of both live commerce and live commerce spillover effect on the price decisions as well as the anchor's service effort.

The authors establish a live commerce supply chain model where the manufacturer sells related products directly and by the anchor with a wholesale price contract. The manufacturer decides the price of product sold directly based on the anchor's broadcast effort since there exists the live commerce spillover effects. Backward induction is used to solve the Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the anchor.

The results show that (1) the existence of the live commerce spillover effect brings more profit to the manufacturer while it reduces the anchor's profit. Moreover, the total profit of the live commerce supply chain first decreases and then increases as the intensity of the live commerce spillover effect improves. (2) The pricing of products sold directly by the manufacturer and sold through the anchor is nonmonotonic with respect to the live commerce spillover effect. (3) The increase in return cost always leads to an increase in the profit of the anchor, whether it is borne by the anchor or by the consumer. (4) If the baseline return probability is high, the anchor should increase her effort, thus securing more profit. However, the spillover effect of live commerce and the horizontal differences between products will discourage the anchor from increasing the live streaming service level.

The study proposes the live commerce supply chain model where the anchor balances the cost and benefit of her live broadcast effort, which lowers the consumers expected return possibility. In addition the live commerce spillover effect is introduced, reducing the expected return rate for the related products without live broadcast (in the direct channel). With the inter-influence of live commerce, the price competition between the live anchor and the manufacturer becomes more complex. By solving the typical live commerce game model, managerial insights are given for the decision makers among the live commerce supply chain.